David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57 (2009)
is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery of Ockhamism, with its distinction between hard facts and soft facts; indeed, those arguments do not require any complex machinery at all. Instead, those arguments are built on an uncontroversial understanding of the idea that truth depends on the world. In the final section of the article, those arguments are extended to show that foreknowledge of an action does not threaten that action's freedom.
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Patrick Todd (2013). Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.
John Fischer (2011). Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the Past. Philosophia 39 (3):461-474.
John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft (2013). Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question? Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.
J. Westphal (2012). The Logic of the Compatibility of God's Foreknowledge and Human Freewill. Analysis 72 (4):746-748.
Trenton Merricks (2009). Propositional Attitudes? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):207 - 232.
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