The Causal Impotency Objection to Vegetarianism

Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):53-60 (2008)
Alastair Norcross has argued that there is no morally relevant difference between a person who eats meat and a person who tortures puppies in order to enjoy a certain gustatory sensation. We offer an objection to his argument.
Keywords vegetarianism
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DOI 10.5840/swphilreview200824120
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Neil Levy (2008). Bad Luck Once Again. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):749-754.
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