The model-theoretic argument against realism

Philosophy of Science 47 (1):69-81 (1980)
In "Realism and Reason" Hilary Putnam has offered an apparently strong argument that the position of metaphysical realism provides an incoherent model of the relation of a correct scientific theory to the world. However, although Putnam's attack upon the notion of the "intended" interpretation of a scientific theory is sound, it is shown here that realism may be formulated in such a way that the realist need make no appeal to any "intended" interpretation of such a theory. Consequently, it can be shown that realism is immune to Putnam's criticism and that attempts at reformulating this criticism are not likely to meet with success
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Peter M. Ainsworth (2009). Newman's Objection. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):135-171.
Ben Caplan & Chris Tillman (2013). Benacerraf's Revenge. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):111-129.
Mary Kate McGowan (2002). Gruesome Connections. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):21-33.

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