What Are You Doing? What Am I Doing?

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):257-279 (2005)
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Abstract

Psychology ought to describe how and explain why we human beings live our lives as we do, which necessarily comes down to how and why we engage in the actions and have the subjective experiencings that we do. Our physical actions are themselves in part subjective phenomena, because actions are not simply body movements but also essentially involve intentions, beliefs about specific causation, and a sense of voluntariness. Thus, whatever else it is, psychology is inescapably the science of explaining the personally subjective. It is time for psychology to openly embrace its subjective subject-matter as such, which would open up a vast domain still waiting to be systematically studied. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

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