Counterfactuals, probabilities, and information: Response to critics

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):635 – 642 (2008)
In earlier work we proposed an account of information grounded in counterfactual conditionals rather than probabilities, and argued that it might serve philosophical needs that more familiar probabilistic alternatives do not. Demir [2008] and Scarantino [2008] criticize the counterfactual approach by contending that its alleged advantages are illusory and that it fails to secure attractive desiderata. In this paper we defend the counterfactual account from these criticisms, and suggest that it remains a useful account of information.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802340592
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Andrea Scarantino (2015). Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):419-443.
Hilmi Demir (2012). The Counterfactual Theory of Information Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):183 - 185.

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