The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective
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| Abstract | Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into the theoretical model as it grows and becomes more refined. This paper makes an attempt at sketching the outlines of such a theory, offering a representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person perspective. Three phenomenal target properties are centrally relevant: | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesDavid J. Chalmers (1999). First-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness. Consciousness Bulletin.
Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli (2005). Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.
Joseph Neisser (2008). Subjectivity and the Limits of Narrative. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2):51-66.
Reinaldo Bernal Velásquez (2011). Materialism and the Subjectivity of Experience. Philosophia 39 (1):39-49.
Josh Weisberg (2003). Being All That We Can Be: A Critical Review of Thomas Metzinger's Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):89-96.
Thomas Metzinger (2003). Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
Thomas Metzinger (2000). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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