The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into the theoretical model as it grows and becomes more refined. This paper makes an attempt at sketching the outlines of such a theory, offering a representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person perspective. Three phenomenal target properties are centrally relevant
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Kai Vogeley & Gereon R. Fink (2003). Neural Correlates of the First-Person Perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):38-42.
N. David, A. Newen & K. Vogeley (2008). The “Sense of Agency” and its Underlying Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):523-534.
Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese (2003). The Emergence of a Shared Action Ontology: Building Blocks for a Theory. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):549-571.
P. Bob (2008). Pain, Dissociation and Subliminal Self-Representations. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):355-369.
Cyriel M. A. Pennartz (2009). Identification and Integration of Sensory Modalities: Neural Basis and Relation to Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):718-739.
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