The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationist analysis of the first-person perspective
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press 285--306 (2000)
This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures
|Keywords||*Consciousness States *Experiences (Events) *Subjectivity Neural Pathways Philosophies Physiological Correlates Social Cognition|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Buhrmann & Ezequiel Di Paolo (forthcoming). The Sense of Agency – a Phenomenological Consequence of Enacting Sensorimotor Schemes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-30.
Frederic Peters (2014). Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues. Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.
Similar books and articles
Peter Carruthers (2004). Suffering Without Subjectivity. Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.
Thomas Metzinger (2004). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. Networks:285--306.
Thomas Metzinger (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.
Gerald M. Edelman & Giulio Srinivasan Tononi (2000). Reentry and the Dynamic Core: Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press
Thomas Metzinger (2003). Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
Josh Weisberg (2003). Being All That We Can Be: A Critical Review of Thomas Metzinger's Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):89-96.
Joseph Neisser (2008). Subjectivity and the Limits of Narrative. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2):51-66.
Reinaldo J. Bernal (2011). Materialism and the Subjectivity of Experience. Philosophia 39 (1):39-49.
David J. Chalmers (2000). What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press 17--39.
Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). How to Understand the N in NCC. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads398 ( #4,683 of 1,934,456 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #29,090 of 1,934,456 )
How can I increase my downloads?