The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationist analysis of the first-person perspective
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In , Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 285--306 (2000)
This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures
|Keywords||*Consciousness States *Experiences (Events) *Subjectivity Neural Pathways Philosophies Physiological Correlates Social Cognition|
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