Graduate studies at Western
Analysis 62 (3):211–216 (2002)
|Abstract||The aim of this paper is to draw attention to a conﬂict between two popular views about time: Arthur Prior’s proposal for treating tense on the model of modal logic, and the ‘Platonic’ thesis that some objects (God, forms, universals, or numbers) exist eternally.1 I will argue that anyone who accepts the former ought to reject the latter.|
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