The presentist's dilemma

Philosophical Studies 122 (3):213 - 225 (2005)
Abstract
This paper defends three theses: (i) that presentism is either trivial or untenable; (ii) that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and (iii) that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism.
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Markosian (2004). A Defence of Presentism. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1 (3):47-82.

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Citations of this work BETA
Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
Ulrich Meyer (2009). 'Now' and 'Then' in Tense Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):229-247.

View all 7 citations

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