The presentist's dilemma

Philosophical Studies 122 (3):213 - 225 (2005)
This paper defends three theses: (i) that presentism is either trivial or untenable; (ii) that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and (iii) that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.2307/4321558
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Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.

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