Learning with neighbours
Synthese 183 (S1):87-109 (2011)
| Abstract | I present a game-theoretical multi-agent system to simulate the evolutionary process responsible for the pragmatic phenomenon division of pragmatic labour (DOPL), a linguistic convention emerging from evolutionary forces. Each agent is positioned on a toroid lattice and communicates via signaling games , where the choice of an interlocutor depends on the Manhattan distance between them. In this framework I compare two learning dynamics: reinforcement learning (RL) and belief learning (BL). An agent’s experiences from previous plays influence his communication behaviour, and RL agents act in a non-rational way whereas BL agents display a small degree of rationality by using best response dynamics . The complete system simulates an evolutionary process of communication strategies, which agents can learn in a structured spatial society. The significant questions are: what circumstances could lead to an evolutionary process that doesn’t result in the expected DOPL convention; and to what extent is interlocutor rationality necessary for the emergence of a society-wide convention à la DOPL? | |||||||||
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Karl Tuyls, Ann Nowe, Tom Lenaerts & Bernard Manderick (2004). An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Perspective on Learning in Multi-Agent Systems. Synthese 139 (2):297 - 330.
Pierre Barbaroux & Gilles Enée (2005). Spontaneous Coordination and Evolutionary Learning Processes in an Agent-Based Model. Mind and Society 4 (2):179-195.
Marion Blute (2001). A Single-Process Learning Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):529-531.
Timo Honkela, Ville Könönen, Tiina Lindh‐Knuutila & Mari‐Sanna Paukkeri (2008). Simulating Processes of Concept Formation and Communication. Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):245-259.
Peter Hammerstein (2000). Evolution, Learning, Games, and Simple Heuristics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):752-753.
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