Marginal Humans, The Argument From Kinds, And The Similarity Argument

Facta Universitatis 5 (1):47-63 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper I will examine two responses to the argument from marginal cases; the argument from kinds and the similarity argument. I will argue that these arguments are insufficient to show that all humans have moral status but no animals do. This does not prove that animals have moral status but it does shift the burden of proof onto those who want to maintain that all humans are morally considerable, but no animals are.
Keywords Marginal Humans  The Argument From Kinds  The Similarity Argument  Argument From Similarity
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Julia Tanner (2011). Rowlands, Rawlsian Justice and Animal Experimentation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):569-587.
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