II. Frege as Idealist and then Realist
Inquiry 22 (1-4):350-357 (1979)
| Abstract | Michael Dummett argued that Frege was a realist while Hans Sluga countered that he was an objective idealist in the rationalist tradition of Kant and Lotze. Sluga ties Frege's idealism to the context principle which he argues Frege never gave up. It is argued that Sluga has correctly interpreted the pre?1891 Frege while Dummett is correct concerning the later period. It is also claimed that the context principle was dropped prior to 1891 to be replaced by the doctrine of unsaturated entities | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesErich H. Reck (2007). Frege on Truth, Judgment, and Objectivity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):149-173.
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