David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 141 (1):43 - 61 (2008)
Quine’s general approach is to treat ontology as a matter of what a theory says there is. This turns ontology into a question of which existential statements are consequences of that theory. This approach is contrasted favourably with the view that takes ontological commitment as a relation to things. However within the broadly Quinean approach we can distinguish different accounts, differing as to the nature of the consequence relation best suited for determining those consequences. It is suggested that Quine’s own narrowly formal account fails. Then a consideration of the necessitation approach championed by Jackson and Lewis shows that it does not do justice to the role of acknowledging consequences in determining rationality. I suggest that an approach which puts a priori consequence as the key relation does a better job. The task of spelling out the nature of a priori consequence is sketched, along with reasons to doubt the adequacy of the double indexing approach to analysing the a priori. The sorts of relations we can stand in to theories which allow us to inherit ontological commitments are touched on with a number of important philosophical strategies for introducing belief-like attitudes which nevertheless avoid ontological commitment.
|Keywords||Ontological commitment Logical entailment Quine|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Richard L. Cartwright (1954). Ontology and the Theory of Meaning. Philosophy of Science 21 (4):316-325.
Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
David Lewis (1980). Index, Context, and Content. In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel. 79-100.
Citations of this work BETA
Stephan Krämer (2014). Implicit Commitment in Theory Choice. Synthese 191 (10):2147-2165.
Similar books and articles
Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). Too Much Ado About Belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):185-200.
Patrick Dieveney (2012). In Defense of Quinean Ontological Naturalism. Erkenntnis 76 (2):225-242.
David Manley (2009). When Best Theories Go Bad. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):392-405.
Gyula Klima (2005). Quine, Wyman, and Buridan: Three Approaches to Ontological Commitment. Korean Journal of Logic 8:1-22.
Berit Brogaard (2008). Inscrutability and Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):21 - 42.
Yvonne Raley (2007). Ontology, Commitment, and Quine's Criterion. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3):271-290.
Jamin Asay (2010). How to Express Ontological Commitment in the Vernacular. Philosophia Mathematica 18 (3):293-310.
Howard Peacock (2011). Two Kinds of Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):79-104.
Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truthmaker Commitments. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads82 ( #18,407 of 1,140,333 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #46,721 of 1,140,333 )
How can I increase my downloads?