Ontology and logic: remarks on hartry field's anti-platonist philosophy of mathematics

History and Philosophy of Logic 6 (1):191-209 (1985)
In Science without numbers Hartry Field attempted to formulate a nominalist version of Newtonian physics?one free of ontic commitment to numbers, functions or sets?sufficiently strong to have the standard platonist version as a conservative extension. However, when uses for abstract entities kept popping up like hydra heads, Field enriched his logic to avoid them. This paper reviews some of Field's attempts to deflate his ontology by inflating his logic
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    References found in this work BETA
    John P. Burgess (1984). Synthetic Mechanics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (4):379 - 395.
    Charles S. Chihara (1984). A Simple Type Theory Without Platonic Domains. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (3):249 - 283.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Russell Marcus (2013). Intrinsic Explanation and Field's Dispensabilist Strategy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):163 - 183.
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