David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 6 (1):191-209 (1985)
In Science without numbers Hartry Field attempted to formulate a nominalist version of Newtonian physics?one free of ontic commitment to numbers, functions or sets?sufficiently strong to have the standard platonist version as a conservative extension. However, when uses for abstract entities kept popping up like hydra heads, Field enriched his logic to avoid them. This paper reviews some of Field's attempts to deflate his ontology by inflating his logic
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Willard van Orman Quine (1996). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Hartry Field (1980). Science Without Numbers. Princeton University Press.
Nelson Goodman (1951). The Structure of Appearance. Harvard University Press.
Nelson Goodman & W. V. Quine (1947). Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):105-122.
Citations of this work BETA
Russell Marcus (2013). Intrinsic Explanation and Field's Dispensabilist Strategy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):163-183.
Penelope Maddy (1989). The Roots of Contemporary Platonism. Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1121-1144.
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Hartry Field (1989). Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Basil Blackwell.
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Hartry Field (1982). Realism and Anti-Realism About Mathematics. Philosophical Topics 13 (1):45-69.
Hartry Field (1988). Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
Michael D. Resnik (1985). How Nominalist is Hartry Field's Nominalism? Philosophical Studies 47 (2):163 - 181.
Kevin Scharp (2010). Truth's Saviour? [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):183 - 188.
John A. Humphrey (1993). Some Objections to Putnam's “Consistency Objection”. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:127-141.
Glen Meyer (2009). Extending Hartry Field's Instrumental Account of Applied Mathematics to Statistical Mechanics. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (3):273-312.
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