Privileged standpoints/ reliable processes

Hypatia 23 (1):65-98 (2008)
Abstract
: This article attempts to reconcile Sandra Harding's postmodernist standpoint theory with process reliabilism in first-order epistemology and naturalism in metaepistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory is best understood as consisting of an applied epistemological component and a metaepistemological component. Naturalist metaepistemology and the metaepistemological component of postmodernist standpoint theory have produced complementary views of knowledge as a socially and naturally located phenomenon and have converged on a common concept of objectivity. The applied epistemological claims of postmodernist standpoint theory usefully can be construed as applications of process reliabilist first-order epistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory, reliabilism, and naturalism thus form a coherent package of views in metaepistemology, first-order epistemology, and applied epistemology
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References found in this work BETA
Louise M. Antony (2002). Embodiment and Epistemology. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 463--478.
Louise M. Antony (2000). Situating Feminist Epistemology. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:31-40.

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