Testimony as a natural kind

Episteme 5 (2):pp. 180-202 (2008)
Abstract
I argue, first, that testimony is likely a natural kind (where natural kinds are accurately described by the homoeostatic property cluster theory) and that if it is indeed a natural kind, it is likely necessarily reliable. I argue, second, that the view of testimony as a natural kind and as necessarily reliable grounds a novel, naturalist global reductionism about testimonial justification and that this new reductionism is immune to a powerful objection to orthodox Humean global reductionism, the objection from the too-narrow induction base
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References found in this work BETA
Barbara Abbott (1989). Nondescriptionality and Natural Kind Terms. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (3):269 - 291.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kourken Michaelian (2012). (Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):481-514.
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