The Non-arbitrariness of Reasons: Reply to Lenman

Utilitas 11 (2):178 (1999)
James Lenman is critical of my claim that moral requirements are requirements of reason. I argue that his criticisms miss their target. More importantly, I argue that the anti-rationalism that informs Lenman's criticisms is itself implausible
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820800002417
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