Tichý on Kripke on A Posteriori Necessities

Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):113 - 126 (1998)
In Tichy's influential attack, a number of egregious errors are attributed to Kripke's seminal distinction of epistemic and metaphysical dimensions in meaning. I argue that Tichy's work is based on important misunderstandings. In particular Tichy attributes to Kripke the mistaken view that it is propositions, that is sets of worlds, which are the proper object of the appellation "a priori" and "a posteriori". I show that this is a mistaken attribution. Further, I argue that propositions cannot be uniquely associated with these appellations. Thus, the position Tichy mistakenly attributes to Kripke, a position which Tichy actually endorses, is unsustainable
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Michaelis Michael (2008). Implicit Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):43 - 61.

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