David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103 (2007)
In this essay, I argue that the deflationary view of truth is inconsistent with Davidson's theory of meaning. I take deflationism to consist of two basic theses: the linguistic thesis that truth talk is always expressive and never explanatory, and the metaphysical thesis that truth is not a property. Since Davidson construes meaning in terms of truth-conditions, it appears that Davidson regards truth talk as explanatory, and truth as a property. Michael Williams argues otherwise, suggesting that Davidson's theory of meaning can be understood in terms of his theory of radical interpretation, and that radical interpretation does not require a notion of truth richer than the deflationist allows. I argue that at the level of the T-sentences Davidson's theory of meaning entails (T-sentences yielded through the practice of radical interpretation), a non-deflationary notion of truth is indeed required. This is because, first, for Davidson, to grasp the meaning of a sentence is to grasp the T-sentence associated with it, and the T-sentence predicates the property truth of that sentencesecond, because it does so, in T-sentences "true" is explanatory, not merely expressive. I then consider the objection that T-sentences can be understood in terms of a norm of assertion, rather in terms of "true" as predicating a property of sentences, and I respond that the objection confuses pragmatic issues with semantic issues
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John Collins (2002). Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):497-536.
Scott Soames (2008). Truth and Meaning: In Perspective. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):1-19.
Gary Kemp (2002). Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236.
Jim Edwards (2007). Response to Hoeltje: Davidson Vindicated? Mind 116 (461):131-141.
J. E. Malpas (1992). Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning: Holism, Truth, Interpretation. Cambridge University Press.
Douglas Patterson (2005). Deflationism and the Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271 - 294.
Jeff Speaks (2006). Truth Theories, Translation Manuals, and Theories of Meaning. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (4):487 - 505.
Wang Lu (2008). Theories of Meaning. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (1):83-98.
Bradley Dowden, Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Claire Horisk (2007). The Expressive Role of Truth in Truth-Conditional Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):535–557.
H. G. Callaway (1988). Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditional Semantics. Erkenntnis 28 (1):3 - 27.
Steven Gross (2012). Davidson, First-Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
Nic Damnjanovic (2010). New Wave Deflationism. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan. 45--58.
James R. Beebe, Prosentential Theory of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads19 ( #94,063 of 1,101,833 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #91,766 of 1,101,833 )
How can I increase my downloads?