Graduate studies at Western
Acta Analytica 22 (1):48-73 (2007)
|Abstract||The paper argues that there is such a thing as luck in acquisition of candidate a priori beliefs and knowledge, and that the possibility of luck in this “armchair” domain shows that definitions of believing by luck that p offered in literature are inadequate, since they mostly rely on the possibility of it being the case that not- p. When p is necessary, such a definition should be supplemented by one pointing to variation in belief, not in the fact believed. Thus the paper suggests a focus upon the agent and her epistemic virtue in the account of epistemic luck in general.|
|Keywords||epistemic luck a priori knowledge virtue epistemology skepticism|
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