David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):5-41 (2003)
The paper defends causal explanationism concerning our modal intuitions and judgments, and, in particular, the following claims. If a causally explainable mirroring or “pre-established harmony” between our mind and modal reality obtains, we are justified in believing it does. We do not hold our modal beliefs compulsively and blindly but with full subjective and objective justification. Therefore, causal explanation of our modal beliefs does not undermine rational trust in them. Explanation and trust support each other. In contrast, anti-explanationists , claim that causal explanation of intuitions and judgments undermines rational trust in them. They especially target causal explanation in terms of pre-established harmony between our mind, shaped by causal processes, and the underlying modal structure of reality. The paper argues against them. The argument builds upon the claim that the appeal to modal facts is indispensable for systematization and explanation of non-modal ones. Therefore, we should assume that modal facts exist and are not disjoint and isolated from actual facts. The modal structure of the universe intervenes in the non-modal reality. Causal processes indirectly carry information about deep modal structure. Any causal explanation of our intuitional modal beliefs should start from this indirect contact with and information about modal facts. Therefore, if our intuitional modal beliefs are true and causally explainable , they are true in virtue of the deep underlying modal structure. They are sensitive to modal reality and track it. We can come to know this fact, and thus strengthen our spontaneous trust in our modal intuitions
|Keywords||modal beliefs modal intuition causal explanation modal reality anti-explanationism|
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References found in this work BETA
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Christopher Peacocke (1998). Being Known. Oxford University Press.
Ernest Sosa (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Nagel (1997). The Last Word. OUP Usa.
Joel Pust (2000). Intuitions as Evidence. Routledge.
Citations of this work BETA
Stephen K. McLeod (2005). Modal Epistemology. Philosophical Books 46 (3):235-245.
Stephen McLeod (2005). Modal Epistemology. Philosophical Books 46 (3):235-245.
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