David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Acta Analytica 26 (1):75-93 (2011)
The paper defends a neo-Lockean view of secondary qualities, in particular color, according to which the being of a given color amounts to having the disposition to produce in normal viewers under normal circumstances the response of seeing an objective manifest simple color. It also defends the view that the naïve color-concept, the simple color concept, so to speak, is a fully objective property. The defense of this view is carried against its nearest cousin , the view proposed and defended by Philip Pettit and Frank Jackson, according to which the naive color concept is response dependent, whereas color itself is fully objective. It is argued that the neo-Lockean alternative better captures the phenomenology of color, and better predicts or accounts for the dramatic character of the historical scientific discoveries (of Newton and his followers). Against metaphysical response dependence, the paper proposes a brief positive argument from the unity of color properties, and a criticism of Jackson’s counter-argument against metaphysical response-dependence from the naïve intuitions about causal properties of color
|Keywords||Color Response-dependence Manifest image Secondary qualities|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John Locke (1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
David J. Chalmers (2006). Perception and the Fall From Eden. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 49--125.
Mohan P. Matthen (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Rae Langton (1998). Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Andraž Stožer & Janez Bregant (forthcoming). Physicalist and Dispositionalist Views on Colour: A Physiological Objection. Acta Analytica:1-21.
Similar books and articles
Nenad Miscevic (2007). Is Color-Dispositionalism Nasty and Unecological? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):203 - 231.
Mohan Matthen (2010). Color Experience: A Semantic Theory. In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press 67--90.
Nenad Miščević (2004). Response-Intentionalism About Color. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):179-191.
Nenad Miščević (2012). Color. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):489-507.
Wayne Wright (2003). A Dilemma for Jackson and Pargetter's Account of Color. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):125-42.
Joshua Gert (2010). Color Constancy and the Color/Value Analogy. Ethics 121 (1):58-87.
Vivian Mizrahi (2006). Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism. Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.
Stephen E. Palmer (1999). On Qualia, Relations, and Structure in Color Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):976-985.
Peter W. Ross (2012). Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138.
Yasmina Jraissati (2013). Proving Universalism Wrong Does Not Prove Relativism Right: Considerations on the Ongoing Color Categorization Debate. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-24.
Peter W. Ross (2001). Locating Color: Further Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):146-156.
Wayne Wright (2003). Projectivist Representationalism and Color. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.
David M. Rosenthal (2001). Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93.
Joseph Levine (2006). Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing. Dialectica 60 (3):269-282.
Added to index2010-12-28
Total downloads28 ( #140,705 of 1,906,946 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #200,756 of 1,906,946 )
How can I increase my downloads?