David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):179-191 (2004)
Building on Crane’s intentionalism, the paper proposes a variant of response-dependentist view of colors. To be of a color C is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal C-experience. The view is dubbed “response-intentionalism”. It follows from the following considerations, with the red of a tomato surface taken as an example of color C. Full phenomenal red is being visaged (intentionally experienced) as being on the surface of the tomato. Science tells us that full phenomenal red is not on the surface of the tomato. Equally, full phenomenal red is not a property of subjective state but its intentional object. Response-intentionalism follows by considerations of charity, i.e. minimizing and rationalizing the error of the cognizer, and of inference to the best explanation: being red in scientific sense is being such as to cause the response (intentionally) visaging phenomenal red in normal observers under normal circumstances
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Nenad Miscevic (2007). Is Color-Dispositionalism Nasty and Unecological? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):203 - 231.
Nenad Miscevic (2004). Response-Intentionalism About Color: A Sketch. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):179-191.
Max Deutsch (2005). Intentionalism and Intransitivity. Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
Nenad Miščević (2012). Color. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):489-507.
Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Colors and Color Spaces. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center. 83-89.
Nenad Miščević (2011). No More Tears in Heaven: Two Views of Response-Dependence. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 26 (1):75-93.
Kathrin Glüer (2012). Colors and the Content of Color Experience. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):421-437.
Michael Watkins (2008). Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
David M. Rosenthal (1999). The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Kluwer. 95--118.
Philip Pettit (2003). Looks as Powers. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.
Jonathan Cohen (2004). Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto. Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & David Sparrow (2002). A Light Theory of Color. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):267-284.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads6 ( #202,005 of 1,098,978 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #287,052 of 1,098,978 )
How can I increase my downloads?