David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):359-379 (2011)
In this article, after presenting the basic idea of causal accounts of implementation and the problems they are supposed to solve, I sketch the model of computation preferred by Chalmers and argue that it is too limited to do full justice to computational theories in cognitive science. I also argue that it does not suffice to replace Chalmers’ favorite model with a better abstract model of computation; it is necessary to acknowledge the causal structure of physical computers that is not accommodated by the models used in computability theory. Additionally, an alternative mechanistic proposal is outlined.
|Keywords||computation implementation analog computing computational explanation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Marcin Miłkowski (forthcoming). Explanatory Completeness and Idealization in Large Brain Simulations: A Mechanistic Perspective. Synthese:1-22.
Eric Hochstein (forthcoming). One Mechanism, Many Models: A Distributed Theory of Mechanistic Explanation. Synthese:1-21.
Maria Serban (forthcoming). The Scope and Limits of a Mechanistic View of Computational Explanation. Synthese:1-26.
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