David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 19 (4):465-475 (2009)
In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Daniel Dennett claims that evolution is algorithmic. On Dennett’s analysis, evolutionary processes are trivially algorithmic because he assumes that all natural processes are algorithmic. I will argue that there are more robust ways to understand algorithmic processes that make the claim that evolution is algorithmic empirical and not conceptual. While laws of nature can be seen as compression algorithms of information about the world, it does not follow logically that they are implemented as algorithms by physical processes. For that to be true, the processes have to be part of computational systems. The basic difference between mere simulation and real computing is having proper causal structure. I will show what kind of requirements this poses for natural evolutionary processes if they are to be computational.
|Keywords||physical computation algorithmic process evolution algorithmic information theory Dennett simulation|
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References found in this work BETA
Jeremy C. Ahouse (1998). The Tragedy of a Priori Selectionism: Dennett and Gould on Adaptationism. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 13 (3):359-391.
Robert C. Cummins (1975). Functional Analysis. Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
Daniel C. Dennett & Jon Hodge (1997). Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):435-438.
Jerry Fodor (1996). Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin. Mind and Language 11 (3):246-262.
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