David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In B. H. Ross, D. M. Bartels, C. W. Bauman, L. J. Skitka & D. L. Medin (eds.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 50: Moral Judgment and Decision Making. Academic Press (2009)
Could a computer be programmed to make moral judgments about cases of intentional harm and unreasonable risk that match those judgments people already make intuitively? If the human moral sense is an unconscious computational mechanism of some sort, as many cognitive scientists have suggested, then the answer should be yes. So too if the search for reflective equilibrium is a sound enterprise, since achieving this state of affairs requires demarcating a set of considered judgments, stating them as explanandum sentences, and formulating a set of algorithms from which they can be derived. The same is true for theories that emphasize the role of emotions or heuristics in moral cognition, since they ultimately depend on intuitive appraisals of the stimulus that accomplish essentially the same tasks. Drawing on deontic logic, action theory, moral philosophy, and the common law of tort, particularly Terry's five-variable calculus of risk, I outline a formal model of moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence along the foregoing lines, which defines the abstract properties of the relevant mapping and demonstrates their descriptive adequacy with respect to a range of common moral intuitions, which experimental studies have suggested may be universal or nearly so. Framing effects, protected values, and implications for the neuroscience of moral intuition are also discussed.
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Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman (2012). Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers. Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
Susan Dwyer, Bryce Huebner & Marc D. Hauser (2010). The Linguistic Analogy: Motivations, Results, and Speculations. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):486-510.
Michael Pardo & Dennis Patterson (2011). Minds, Brains, and Norms. Neuroethics 4 (3):179-190.
J. Charles Millar, John Turri & Ori Friedman (2014). For the Greater Goods? Ownership Rights and Utilitarian Moral Judgment. Cognition 133 (1):79-84.
Han Gong, Rumen Iliev & Sonya Sachdeva (forthcoming). Consequences Are Far Away: Psychological Distance Affects Modes of Moral Decision Making. Cognition.
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