Making Naturalised Epistemology (Slightly) Normative
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Konrad Talmont-Kaminski & Marcin Miłkowski (eds.), Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity (2010)
The standard objection against naturalised epistemology is that it cannot account for normativity in epistemology (Putnam 1982; Kim 1988). There are different ways to deal with it. One of the obvious ways is to say that the objection misses the point: It is not a bug; it is a feature, as there is nothing interesting in normative principles in epistemology. Normative epistemology deals with norms but they are of no use in prac-tice. They are far too general to be guiding principles of research, up to the point that they even seem vacuous (see Knowles 2003). In this chapter, my strategy will be different and more in spirit of the founding father of naturalized epistemology, Quine, though not faithful to the letter. I focus on methodological prescriptions supplied by cogni-tive science in re-engineering of cognitive architectures. Engineering norms based on mechanism design weren’t treated as seriously as they should in epistemology, and that is why I will develop a sketch of a framework for researching them, starting from analysing cognitive sci-ence as engineering in section 3, then showing functional normativity in section 4, to eventually present functional engineering models of cogni-tive mechanisms as normative in section 5. Yet before showing the kind of engineering normativity specific for these prescriptions, it is worth-while to review briefly the role of normative methodology and the levels of norm complexity in it, and show how it follows Quine’s steps.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Chase Wrenn (2006). Epistemology as Engineering? Theoria 72 (1):60-79.
Barbara Trybulec (2008). Naturalizm bez normatywności? Głos w obronie epistemologii znaturalizowanej. Filozofia Nauki 2.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35 - 49.
M. Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Christine Tappolet & Alan Voizard (2011). The Philosophy of Normativity, or How to Try Clearing Things Up a Little. Dialogue 50 (02):233-238.
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski & Marcin Miłkowski (eds.) (2010). Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
Ellen R. Klein (1992). Is 'Normative Naturalism' an Oxymoron? Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):287 – 297.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2002). Generalizing and Normalizing Quine's Epistemology. Philosophical Writings 19:3-21.
Harold I. Brown (1988). Normative Epistemology and Naturalized Epistemology. Inquiry 31 (1):53 – 78.
Christopher Hookway (1994). Naturalized Epistemology and Epistemic Evaluation. Inquiry 37 (4):465 – 485.
Sharyn Clough (2004). Having It All: Naturalized Normativity in Feminist Science Studies. Hypatia 19 (1):102-118.
Sergei Gepshtein (2009). Closing the Gap Between Ideal and Real Behavior: Scientific Vs. Engineering Approaches to Normativity. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):61 – 75.
A. Rosenberg (1999). Naturalistic Epistemology for Eliminative Materialists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):335-358.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2010-09-20
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?