Realism versus instrumentalism in a new statistical framework

Philosophy of Science 73 (4):440-447 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper, I offer a new defense of scientific realism, tailored for the Akaikean paradigm of statistical hypothesis testing. After proposing definitions of verisimilitude and predictive success, I use computer simulations to show how the latter depends on the former, even in the kind of case featured in a recent argument for instrumentalism.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jan Sprenger (2013). The Role of Bayesian Philosophy Within Bayesian Model Selection. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):101-114.
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