Analytic Method, the Cogito, and Descartes's Argument for the Innateness of the Idea of God

The analytic method by which Descartes discovered the first principle of his philosophy—cogito, ergo sum—is a unique cognitive process of direct insight and nonlogical inference. It differs markedly from inductive as well as deductive procedures, but also from older models of the direct noetic apprehension of first principles, notably those of Plato and Aristotle. However, a critical examination of Descartes’s argument for the innateness of the idea of God shows that there are serious obstacles in the way of his employment of the analytic method of discovery to reach this or any other conclusion about ideas that do not fall within the scope of ordinary human experience
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/epoche20101426
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 20,866
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Jesús A. Díaz (1988). Cartesian Analyticity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):47-55.
Peter Slezak (2010). Doubts About Indubitability. Philosophical Forum 41 (4):389-412.
Daniel Dennett (2008). Descartes's Argument From Design. Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):333 - 345.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

44 ( #95,237 of 1,907,145 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #161,264 of 1,907,145 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.