Studia Logica 90 (3):425 - 453 (2008)
|Abstract||Uncertainty and vagueness/imprecision are not the same: one can be certain about events described using vague predicates and about imprecisely specified events, just as one can be uncertain about precisely specified events. Exactly because of this, a question arises about how one ought to assign probabilities to imprecisely specified events in the case when no possible available evidence will eradicate the imprecision (because, say, of the limits of accuracy of a measuring device). Modelling imprecision by rough sets over an approximation space presents an especially tractable case to help get one’s bearings. Two solutions present themselves: the first takes as upper and lower probabilities of the event X the (exact) probabilities assigned X ’s upper and lower rough-set approximations; the second, motivated both by formal considerations and by a simple betting argument, is to treat X ’s rough-set approximation as a conditional event and assign to it a point-valued (conditional) probability.|
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