Beguiled by metaphors: The 'living tree' and originalist constitutional interpretation in canada
| Abstract | The dominant strain of constitutional interpretation in Canada holds both that originalist theories of constitutional interpretation are not a part of Canadian constitutional doctrine, and that this is a very good thing. The Canadian courts (and academy) fully subscribe to a theory of living constitutional interpretation. While living constitutional interpretation in Canada is most often defined in terms of its incompatibility with originalist interpretation, there has not been a meaningful engagement in Canada with contemporary schools of originalist interpretation. The originalism rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985 (and periodically reaffirmed thereafter), is not the New Originalism, and a rejection of this new family of interpretive theories does not necessarily follow from the fact of the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of original intent originalism. Unfortunately, the Canadian courts have continued to affirm living tree constitutional doctrine and denounce originalism without providing much of an account of either theory.This paper is a prefatory study to an engagement with new originalist scholarship. I attempt a statement of the current commitments in Canadian living constitutional doctrine (pausing to engage with theoretical arguments that have been made in its defence) and, in passing, note the Supreme Court's attitudes towards originalism. My purpose is to determine what the central commitments of living tree constitutional doctrine are, as a preliminary step towards a later study to determine the extent to which Canadian doctrine is truly incompatible with orginalist interpretation. I explore what I observe to be the four central commitments to living tree constitutionalism in Canada: (1) the doctrine of progressive interpretation; (2) the use of a purposive methodology in progressive interpretation; (3) the absence of any necessary role for the original intent or meaning of framers in interpreting the constitution; and (4) the presence of other constraints on judicial interpretation. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesJames Allan (2011). The Curious Concept of the 'Living Tree (or Non-Locked-in) Constitution. In Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller (eds.), The Challenge of Originalism: Essays in Constitutional Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Lawrence B. Solum (2011). What is Originalism? : The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory. In Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller (eds.), The Challenge of Originalism: Essays in Constitutional Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Bradley W. Miller (2011). Origin Myth : The Persons Case, the Living Tree, and the New Originalism. In Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller (eds.), The Challenge of Originalism: Essays in Constitutional Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Jeffrey Goldsworthy (2009). Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism. Philosophy Compass 4 (4):682-702.
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