Bare Functional Desire

But this changes nothing. The decisive claim is that in assessing the counterfactuals implicit in (A) we do not have to take sceptical worlds into the reckoning, whereas we must do that in assessing (B) because (B) explicitly speaks of them. Accept, provisionally, what is here said about (B) and focus on the claim about (A). Nobody should make it unless they are already in a position to assert that the actual world is not a sceptical world. And with that we are back to the choice between impotence and redundancy.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Jennifer McKitrick (2003). The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):349–369.
P. D. Magnus (2004). The Price of Insisting That Quantum Mechanics is Complete. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):257-267.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

30 ( #105,336 of 1,727,104 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #147,227 of 1,727,104 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.