Should We Be Population Pluralists? A Reply to Stegenga

Biological Theory 5 (3):271-276 (2010)
In “‘Population’ is Not a Natural Kind of Kinds,” Jacob Stegenga argues against the claim that the concept of “population” is a natural kind and in favor of conceptual pluralism, ostensibly in response to two papers of mine (Millstein 2009, 2010). Pluralism is often an attractive position in the philosophy of science. It certainly is a live possibility for the concept of population in ecology and evolutionary biology, and I welcome the opportunity to discuss the topic further. However, I argue that the case for conceptual pluralism has not yet been made. In what follows, I first clarify the issues at stake before taking up the topic of conceptual pluralism and responding to Stegenga’s criticisms of the causal interactionist population concept.
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DOI 10.1162/BIOT_a_00051
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Roberta L. Millstein (2015). Thinking About Populations and Races in Time. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 52:5-11.

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