David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biological Theory 5 (3):271-276 (2010)
In “‘Population’ is Not a Natural Kind of Kinds,” Jacob Stegenga argues against the claim that the concept of “population” is a natural kind and in favor of conceptual pluralism, ostensibly in response to two papers of mine (Millstein 2009, 2010). Pluralism is often an attractive position in the philosophy of science. It certainly is a live possibility for the concept of population in ecology and evolutionary biology, and I welcome the opportunity to discuss the topic further. However, I argue that the case for conceptual pluralism has not yet been made. In what follows, I ﬁrst clarify the issues at stake before taking up the topic of conceptual pluralism and responding to Stegenga’s criticisms of the causal interactionist population concept.
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