Defending contingentism in metaphysics

Dialectica 63 (1):23-49 (2009)
Abstract
Metaphysics is supposed to tell us about the metaphysical nature of our world: under what conditions composition occurs; how objects persist through time; whether properties are universals or tropes. It is near orthodoxy that whichever of these sorts of metaphysical claims is true is necessarily true. This paper looks at the debate between that orthodox view and a recently emerging view that claims like these are contingent, by focusing on the metaphysical debate between monists and pluralists about concrete particulars. This paper argues that we should be contingentists about monism and pluralism, and it defends contingentism against some necessitarian objections by offering an epistemology of contingent metaphysical claims.
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References found in this work BETA
Ross P. Cameron (2007). The Contingency of Composition. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.
Keith S. Donnellan (1979). The Contingent a Priori and Rigid Designators. In A. French Peter, E. Uehling Theodore, Howard Jr & K. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. University of Minnesota Press. 12-27.

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Citations of this work BETA
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Kantian Monism. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):23-56.
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