Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?

In Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press (2009)
Abstract
Due largely to the work of Mark Murphy and Philip Quinn, divine will theory has emerged as a legitimate alternative to divine command theory in recent years. As an initial characterization, divine will theory is a view of deontological properties according to which, for instance, an agent S‟s obligation to perform action A in circumstances C is grounded in God‟s will that S A in C. Characterized this abstractly, divine will theory does not specify which kind of mental state is supposed to ground S‟s obligation; it could be God‟s desires, beliefs, intentions, or emotions. My purpose here is not to challenge this view. Rather, I want to examine the decision by Murphy and Quinn to base their version of divine will theory on God‟s intentions, and argue that this may have been an unwise move. As an alternative, I suggest that those who are initially attracted to divine will theory would be better served to develop the view with a focus on God‟s desires rather than intentions.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Christian Miller (2009). Divine Desire Theory and Obligation. In Yujin Nagasawa & Erik J. Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan. 105--24.
    Susan Peppers-Bates (2008). Divine Simplicity and Divine Command Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (3):361-369.
    Wes Morriston (2009). The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (1):1 - 10.
    Michael Ridge (1998). Humean Intentions. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):157-178.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-03-15

    Total downloads

    18 ( #78,313 of 1,089,047 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,722 of 1,089,047 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.