David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press (2009)
Due largely to the work of Mark Murphy and Philip Quinn, divine will theory has emerged as a legitimate alternative to divine command theory in recent years. As an initial characterization, divine will theory is a view of deontological properties according to which, for instance, an agent S‟s obligation to perform action A in circumstances C is grounded in God‟s will that S A in C. Characterized this abstractly, divine will theory does not specify which kind of mental state is supposed to ground S‟s obligation; it could be God‟s desires, beliefs, intentions, or emotions. My purpose here is not to challenge this view. Rather, I want to examine the decision by Murphy and Quinn to base their version of divine will theory on God‟s intentions, and argue that this may have been an unwise move. As an alternative, I suggest that those who are initially attracted to divine will theory would be better served to develop the view with a focus on God‟s desires rather than intentions.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Christian Miller (2009). Divine Desire Theory and Obligation. In Yujin Nagasawa & Erik J. Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan. 105--24.
Daniel M. Johnson (2012). The Objectivity of Obligations in Divine Motivation Theory: On Imitation and Submission. Journal of Religious Ethics 40 (3):504-517.
Christopher Dodsworth (2011). Understanding Divine Authority. Faith and Philosophy 28 (2):190-208.
Susan Peppers-Bates (2008). Divine Simplicity and Divine Command Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (3):361-369.
Dale Tuggy (2005). Necessity, Control, and the Divine Command Theory. Sophia 44 (1):53-75.
Wes Morriston (2009). The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (1):1 - 10.
John P. Reeder Jr (1975). A Critique of Graber's Divine Command Theory of Ethics. Journal of Religious Ethics 3 (1):157 - 163.
Janine Marie Idziak (1989). In Search of “Good Positive Reasons” For an Ethics of Divine Commands. Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):47-64.
Richard Scheer (2004). The ‘Mental State’ Theory of Intentions. Philosophy 79 (1):121-131.
Martin Kavka & Randi Rashkover (2004). A Jewish Modified Divine Command Theory. Journal of Religious Ethics 32 (2):387 - 414.
Mark C. Murphy (1998). Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation. Faith and Philosophy 15 (1):3-27.
Simin Rahimi (2012). Divine Command Theory and Theistic Activism. Heythrop Journal 53 (4):551-559.
Robert Audi (2007). Divine Command Morality and the Autonomy of Ethics. Faith and Philosophy 24 (2):121-143.
Michael Ridge (1998). Humean Intentions. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):157-178.
Added to index2011-03-15
Total downloads18 ( #78,313 of 1,089,047 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,722 of 1,089,047 )
How can I increase my downloads?