David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):103–124 (1998)
In chapter VI of Language, Truth, and Logic, A.J. Ayer argues that ethical statements are not literally significant. Unlike metaphysical statements, however, ethical statements are not nonsensical: even though they are not literally significant, Ayer thinks that they possess some other sort of significance. This raises the question: by what principle or criterion can we distinguish, among the class of statements that are not literally significant, between those which are genuinely meaningless and those which possess some other, non-literal form of significance. I suggest that Ayer needs a generalised version of the verification principle in order to answer this question. However, when we formulate the generalised version, it turns out that ethical statements do not satisfy it, so that the emotivist is committed to viewing ethics, like metaphysics, as meaningless verbiage
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
P. H. Esser (1956). B. “Verification” of Statements in Psychiatry. Synthese 10 (1):373-377.
D. J. O'Connor (1950). Some Consequences of Professor A. J. Ayer's Verification Principle. Analysis 10 (3):67 - 72.
Erik Götlind (1954). Ayer on Verification of Negative Statements. Journal of Philosophy 51 (17):490-496.
Rainer Willi Maurer, Falsification of Theories Without Verification of Basic Statements – an Argument for the Possibility of Knowledge Growth.
Anfinn Stigen (1961). Descriptive Analysis and the Sceptic. Inquiry 4 (1-4):228-269.
Anfinn Stigen (1961). Descriptive Analysis and the Sceptic. Inquiry 4 (1-4):228 – 269.
Nathan Nobis (2004). Ayer and Stevenson's Epistemological Emotivisms. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):59-79.
R. G. Swinburne (1974). Meaningfulness Without Confirmability: A Reply. Analysis 35 (1):22 - 27.
Nils Holtug (2002). The Harm Principle. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (4):357-389.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #45,316 of 1,410,166 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #155,015 of 1,410,166 )
How can I increase my downloads?