Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory

Cambridge University Press (2005)
Abstract
Ethics Done Right examines how practical reasoning can be put into the service of ethical and moral theory. Elijah Millgram shows that the key to thinking about ethics is to understand generally how to make decisions. The papers in this volume support a methodological approach and trace the connections between two kinds of theory in utilitarianism, in Kantian ethics, in virtue ethics, in Hume's moral philosophy, and in moral particularism. Unlike other studies of ethics, Ethics Done Right does not advocate a particular moral theory. Rather, it offers a tool that enables one to decide for oneself
Keywords Ethics  Practical reason
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Call number BJ1012.M545 2005
ISBN(s) 0521839432   9780521839433
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