Gert on subjective practical rationality

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):551 - 561 (2008)
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
Keywords Gert  Objective rationality  Subjective rationality  Responsibility  Practical reasons  Internalism
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