David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 118 (471):647-712 (2009)
The ‘New Hume’ interpretation, which sees Hume as a realist about ‘thick’ Causal powers, has been largely motivated by his evident commitment to causal language and causal science. In this, however, it is fundamentally misguided, failing to recognise how Hume exploits his anti-realist conclusions about (upper-case) Causation precisely to support (lower-case) causal science. When critically examined, none of the standard New Humean arguments — familiar from the work of Wright, Craig, Strawson, Buckle, Kail, and others — retains any significant force against the plain evidence of Hume's; texts. But the most devastating objection comes from Hume's own applications of his analysis of causation, to the questions of ‘the immateriality of the soul’ and ‘liberty and necessity’. These show that the New Hume interpretation has misunderstood the entire purpose of his ‘Chief Argument’, and presented him as advocating some of the very positions he is arguing most strongly against
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References found in this work BETA
Michael J. Costa (1989). Hume and Causal Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):172 – 190.
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Millican (2011). Twenty Questions About Hume's “Of Miracles”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 68:151-192.
Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Hume's Scepticism and Realism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):283-309.
John P. Wright (2012). Scepticism, Causal Science and 'The Old Hume'. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):123-142.
James Hill (2012). How Hume Became 'The New Hume': A Developmental Approach. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):163-181.
Stephen Buckle (2013). Hume's Preference for the Enquiry: A Reply to Miller. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1219-1229.
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