Have incommensurability and causal theory of reference anything to do with actual science?—Incommensurability, no; causal theory, yes
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (2):97 – 108 (1991)
|Abstract||Abstract I propose to support these replies with actual episodes in late nineteenth and twentieth century physics. The historical record reveals that meaning does change but not in the Kuhnian manner which is tied to descriptive theories of meaning. A necessary part of this discussion is commentary on realist versus antirealist conceptions of science|
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