Have incommensurability and causal theory of reference anything to do with actual science?—Incommensurability, no; causal theory, yes

Abstract I propose to support these replies with actual episodes in late nineteenth and twentieth century physics. The historical record reveals that meaning does change but not in the Kuhnian manner which is tied to descriptive theories of meaning. A necessary part of this discussion is commentary on realist versus antirealist conceptions of science
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DOI 10.1080/02698599108573383
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.

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Citations of this work BETA
Arthur I. Miller & Frederick W. Bullock (1994). Neutral Currents and the History of Scientific Ideas. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (6):895-931.
Theodore Arabatzis (1996). Rethinking the 'Discovery' of the Electron. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 27 (4):405-435.

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