David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 49 (199):161-174 (1999)
Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical challenge. (publisher)
|Keywords||Disposition Epistemology Meaning Kripke, S Wittgenstein|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
Paul A. Boghossian (1989). The Rule-Following Considerations. Mind 98 (392):507-49.
Jose L. Zalabardo (1997). Kripke's Normativity Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):467-488.
Paul Horwich (1995). Meaning, Use and Truth: On Whether a Use-Theory of Meaning is Precluded by the Requirement That Whatever Constitutes the Meaning of a Predicate Be Capable of Determining the Set of Things of Which the Predicate is True and to Which It Ought to Be Applied. Mind 104 (414):355-368.
Paul Horwich (1984). Book Review:Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Saul Kripke. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-.
Citations of this work BETA
Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
Daniel Whiting (2006). Between Primitivism and Naturalism: Brandom's Theory of Meaning. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (3):3-22.
Matthew Jones (2015). The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):425-443.
Joel Katzav (2004). Horwich on Meaning and Use. Ratio 17 (2):159–175.
Similar books and articles
Carl Ginet (1992). The Dispositionalist Solution to Wittgenstein's Problem About Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73.
Alexander Miller (2010). Kripke's Wittgenstein, Factualism and Meaning. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan
John A. Humphrey (1996). Kripke's Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language: The Same Old Story? Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):197-207.
Alexander Miller (2000). Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174.
A. Collins (1992). On the Paradox Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):74-88.
George M. Wilson (1998). Semantic Realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):99-122.
Michael Kremer (2000). Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):571-584.
Paul Horwich (1990). Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Nature of Meaning. Mind and Language 5 (2):105-121.
Jakob Hohwy (2003). A Reduction of Kripke-Wittgenstein's Objections to Dispositionalism About Meaning. Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-68.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads69 ( #65,161 of 1,934,534 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #91,699 of 1,934,534 )
How can I increase my downloads?