David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174 (2000)
Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical challenge. (publisher)
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
Paul A. Boghossian (1989). The Rule-Following Considerations. Mind 98 (392):507-49.
Jose L. Zalabardo (1997). Kripke's Normativity Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):467-488.
Paul Horwich (1995). Meaning, Use and Truth: On Whether a Use-Theory of Meaning is Precluded by the Requirement That Whatever Constitutes the Meaning of a Predicate Be Capable of Determining the Set of Things of Which the Predicate is True and to Which It Ought to Be Applied. Mind 104 (414):355-368.
Denis McManus (2000). Boghossian, Miller and Lewis on Dispositional Theories of Meaning. Mind and Language 15 (4):393-399.
Citations of this work BETA
Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
Daniel Whiting (2006). Between Primitivism and Naturalism: Brandom's Theory of Meaning. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (3):3-22.
Hannah Ginsborg (2012). I—Hannah Ginsborg: Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
Matthew Jones (2015). The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):425-443.
Joel Katzav (2004). Horwich on Meaning and Use. Ratio 17 (2):159–175.
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Alexander Miller (2010). Kripke's Wittgenstein, Factualism and Meaning. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan
George M. Wilson (1998). Semantic Realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):99-122.
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