Horwich, meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein

Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174 (2000)
Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical challenge. (publisher)
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00177
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References found in this work BETA
Jose L. Zalabardo (1997). Kripke's Normativity Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):467-488.

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Citations of this work BETA
Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
Matthew Jones (2015). The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):425-443.

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