Mind 106 (423):499-519 (1997)
|Abstract||There are many alternative ways that a mind or brain might represent that two of its representations were of the same object or property, the 'Strawson' model, the 'duplicates' model, the 'synchrony' mode, the 'Christmas lights' model, the 'anaphor' model, and so forth. I first discuss what would constitute that a mind or brain was using one of these systems of identity marking rather than another. I then discuss devastating effects that adopting the Strawson model has on the notion that there are such things as modes of presentation in thought. Next I argue that Evans' idea that there are 'dynamic Fregean thoughts' has exactly the same implications. I argue further that all of the other models of thought discussed earlier are in fact isomorphic to the Strawson model. a search for the source of these difficulties reveals the classical notion of modes of presentation as resting on two assumptions, neither of which I recommend. It depends on denying that the way the mind reacts to or understands the thoughts or ideas that it harbours has any bearing on their intentional contents. And it depends on an internalist view of thought content, in particular, on denying that the natural informational content carried or potentially carried by a thought has any bearing on its intentional content.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Srećko Kovač (2007). Contradictions, Objects, and Belief. In Jean-Yves Béziau & Alexandre Costa-Leite (eds.), Perspectives on Universal Logic.
Susana Nuccetelli (2001). 'Latinos', 'Hispanics', and 'Iberoamericans': Naming or Describing? Philosophical Forum 32 (2):175–188.
Joao Branquinho (1999). The Problem of Cognitive Dynamics. Grazer Philosophische Studien Grazen 56:2-15.
Brendan O.’Sullivan (2008). Through Thick and Thin with Ned Block: How Not to Rebut the Property Dualism Argument. Philosophia 36 (4):531-544.
Jakob Hohwy (2011). Mind–Brain Identity and Evidential Insulation. Philosophical Studies 26 (3):261-286.
Steven E. Boër (2003). Thought-Contents and the Formal Ontology of Sense. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):43-114.
John Kulvicki (2007). What is What It's Like? Introducing Perceptual Modes of Presentation. Synthese 156 (2):205 - 229.
Galen Strawson (2003). What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):279-315.
Rod Bertolet (2006). Modes of Presentation and Modes of Determination in Frege. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:233-238.
Krista Lawlor (2005). Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):21-36.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #83,010 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?