David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Economics and Philosophy 24 (2):205-231 (2008)
I present an original model in judgment aggregation theory that demonstrates the general impossibility of consistently describing decision-making purely at the group level. Only a type of unanimity rule can guarantee a group decision is consistent with supporting reasons, and even this possibility is limited to a small class of reasoning methods. The key innovation is that this result holds when individuals can reason in different ways, an allowance not previously considered in the literature. This generalizes judgment aggregation to subjective decision situations, implying that the discursive dilemma persists without individual agreement on the logical constraints. Notably, the model mirrors the typical method of choosing political representatives, and thus suggests that no voting procedure other than unanimity rule can guarantee representation that reflects electorate opinion. Finally, I apply the results to a normative argument for unanimity rule in contract theory and juries, as well as to problems posed for deliberative democratic theory and the concept of representation
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Fabrizio Cariani (2013). Aggregating with Reason(S). Synthese 190 (15):3123-3147.
Similar books and articles
Gabriella Pigozzi (2006). Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-Based Account to Paradoxes of Judgment Aggregation. [REVIEW] Synthese 152 (2):285 - 298.
Fabrizio Cariani, Marc Pauly & Josh Snyder (2008). Decision Framing in Judgment Aggregation. Synthese 163 (1):1 - 24.
Marc Pauly (2007). Axiomatizing Collective Judgment Sets in a Minimal Logical Language. Synthese 158 (2):233 - 250.
Stephan Hartmann, Gabriella Pigozzi & Jan Sprenger (2010). Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation. Journal for Logic and Computation 20:603--617.
Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2007). Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation. Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #250,895 of 1,699,581 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #269,935 of 1,699,581 )
How can I increase my downloads?