Loosing the Word–Concept Tie

Abstract
Sainsbury and Tye (2011) propose that, in the case of names and other simple extensional terms, we should substitute for Frege's second level of content—for his senses—a second level of meaning vehicle—words in the language of thought. I agree. They also offer a theory of atomic concept reference—their ‘originalist’ theory—which implies that people knowing the same word have the ‘same concept’. This I reject, arguing for a symmetrical rather than an originalist theory of concept reference, claiming that individual concepts are possessed only by individual people. Concepts are classified rather than identified across different people
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    References found in this work BETA
    Gareth Evans (1973). The Causal Theory of Names. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 47:187–208.
    Ruth G. Millikan (1993). Knowing What I'm Thinking Of--I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67 (67):91-108.

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