Motivation in agents

Noûs 42 (2):222–266 (2008)
Abstract
The Humean theory of motivation remains the default position in much of the contemporary literature in meta-ethics, moral psychology, and action theory. Yet despite its widespread support, the theory is implausible as a view about what motivates agents to act. More specifically, my reasons for dissatisfaction with the Humean theory stem from its incompatibility with what I take to be a compelling model of the role of motivating reasons in first-person practical deliberation and third-person action explanations. So after first introducing some assumptions about the nature of agency in section one, I will turn to articulating and defending this account of motivating reasons in sections two through four of the paper. Section five then provides some background on the Humean theory before I argue directly against it in section six and critically examine the leading arguments for the view in section seven. Given limitations of space, however, I save the task of developing a positive anti-Humean view for another occasion.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Audi (1986). Acting for Reasons. Philosophical Review 95 (4):511-546.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kieran Setiya (2011). Reasons and Causes. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157.
Christian Miller (2008). Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233 - 255.
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