David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 42 (2):222–266 (2008)
The Humean theory of motivation remains the default position in much of the contemporary literature in meta-ethics, moral psychology, and action theory. Yet despite its widespread support, the theory is implausible as a view about what motivates agents to act. More specifically, my reasons for dissatisfaction with the Humean theory stem from its incompatibility with what I take to be a compelling model of the role of motivating reasons in first-person practical deliberation and third-person action explanations. So after first introducing some assumptions about the nature of agency in section one, I will turn to articulating and defending this account of motivating reasons in sections two through four of the paper. Section five then provides some background on the Humean theory before I argue directly against it in section six and critically examine the leading arguments for the view in section seven. Given limitations of space, however, I save the task of developing a positive anti-Humean view for another occasion.
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
John Turri (2009). The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons. Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
Christian Miller (2013). Identifying with Our Desires. Theoria 79 (2):127-154.
Christian Miller (2008). Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233 - 255.
Kieran Setiya (2011). Reasons and Causes. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157.
Graham Hubbs (2013). Alief and Explanation. Metaphilosophy 44 (5):604-620.
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