David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):163–184 (2004)
The contemporary philosophical debate over practical reasoning-over how one ought to figure out what to do-has been almost entirely focused on whether there is more to it than means-ends reasoning. But a prior and very difficult question has to do with why instrumental deliberation is so important an aspect of our cognitive life (regardless of whether there is anything else). I consider an answer broached by Harry Frankfurt, that having ends is the alternative to being literally bored out of one's mind, and adapt an argument from John Stuart Mill's political and psychological writings to show what more there is to not being bored than just having something to aim for
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
E. Millgram (1996). Review. Practical Reasoning About Final Ends. Henry Richardson. Mind 105 (419):504-506.
Andrew Boucher, The Existence of Numbers (Or: What is the Status of Arithmetic?) By V2.00 Created: 11 Oct 2001 Modified: 3 June 2002 Please Send Your Comments to Abo. [REVIEW]
Dale E. Miller (2004). On Millgram on Mill. Utilitas 16 (1):96-108.
Andrew Hussey (1995). Dead Bored: Debord's Dead. Philosophy Now 14:22-23.
Philip Sinaikin (2009). Bored to Tears? : Depression and Heidegger's Concept of Profound Boredom : A Postpsychiatry Contribution. In James Phillips (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Technology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
Robin Minney (1985). Why Are Pupils Bored in R.E.? - The Ghost Behind Piaget. British Journal of Educational Studies 33 (3):250 - 261.
Espen Hammer (2004). Being Bored: Heidegger on Patience and Melancholy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (2):277 – 295.
Cathal Horan (2008). Bored with Time? Philosophy Now 65:25-27.
James Dreier (2004). Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions. Analysis 64 (1):84–91.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #46,483 of 1,008,787 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,700 of 1,008,787 )
How can I increase my downloads?