Primary qualities, secondary qualities and the truth about intention

Synthese 171 (3):433 - 442 (2009)
Abstract
In this paper I will argue that Crispin Wright’s defence of the claim that the truth about intention is judgement-dependent is unstable because it can serve also to establish that the truth about shape is judgement-dependent, thereby violating his constraint that in developing the distinction between judgement-independent and judgement-dependent subject matters we have to be driven by the assumption that colour and shape will fall on different sides of the divide.
Keywords Primary qualities  Secondary qualities  Truth  Intention  Colour  Shape  Judgement-dependence
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References found in this work BETA
C. J. G. Wright (1988). Moral Values, Projection, and Secondary Qualities. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63:1-26.

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