David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 171 (3):433 - 442 (2009)
In this paper I will argue that Crispin Wright’s defence of the claim that the truth about intention is judgement-dependent is unstable because it can serve also to establish that the truth about shape is judgement-dependent, thereby violating his constraint that in developing the distinction between judgement-independent and judgement-dependent subject matters we have to be driven by the assumption that colour and shape will fall on different sides of the divide.
|Keywords||Primary qualities Secondary qualities Truth Intention Colour Shape Judgement-dependence|
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
Alexander Miller (2007). Another Objection to Wright's Treatment of Intention. Analysis 67 (295):257–263.
C. J. G. Wright (1988). Moral Values, Projection, and Secondary Qualities. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63:1-26.
C. J. G. Wright (1989). Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics. In A. George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky. Blackwell.
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