Rule-following and externalism

Abstract
John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow
Keywords Externalism  Language  Scepticism  Kripke, S  Wittgenstein
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,612
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Alex Byrne (1996). On Misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):339-343.
John McDowell (1992). Putnam on Mind and Meaning. Philosophical Topics 20 (1):35-48.

View all 15 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

132 ( #6,299 of 1,098,428 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #57,129 of 1,098,428 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.