Rule-following and externalism

John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.
Keywords Externalism  Language  Scepticism  Kripke, S  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00329.x
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