Reasons and Experience

Oxford University Press (1991)
Abstract
Millar argues against the tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, he presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. A key theme in his general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach the author develops a view of concepts and their mastery, explores the role of groundless beliefs drawing on suggestions of Wittgenstein, illuminates aspects of the thought of Locke, Hume, Quine, and Goldman, and finally offers a response to a sophisticated variety of scepticism.
Keywords Senses and sensation  Philosophy of mind  Knowledge, Theory of  Belief and doubt
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Call number BD214.M49 1991
ISBN(s) 0198242700   9780198242703  
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Walter Hopp (2009). Conceptualism and the Myth of the Given. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):363-385.

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