David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (1991)
Millar argues against the tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, he presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. A key theme in his general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach the author develops a view of concepts and their mastery, explores the role of groundless beliefs drawing on suggestions of Wittgenstein, illuminates aspects of the thought of Locke, Hume, Quine, and Goldman, and finally offers a response to a sophisticated variety of scepticism
|Keywords||Senses and sensation Philosophy of mind Knowledge, Theory of Belief and doubt|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$15.18 used (88% off) $76.08 new (37% off) $120.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD214.M49 1991|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
John Turri (2009). The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons. Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
Thomas Kelly (2008). Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):933-955.
Coos Engelsma (2015). Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism. Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
Fiona Macpherson (2006). Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.
Similar books and articles
Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
Alan Millar (2004). Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Matthew Nudds (2000). Modes of Perceiving and Imagining. Acta Analytica 15 (24):139-150.
Richard Schantz (1999). The Role of Sensory Experience in Epistemic Justification: A Problem for Coherentism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):177-191.
Bill Brewer (1998). Experience and Reason in Perception. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 203-227.
Peter Losin (1987). Experience of God and the Principle of Credulity. Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):59-70.
Bill Brewer (1999). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.
Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318.
Paul Bloom (2000). Two Reasons to Abandon the False Belief Task as a Test of Theory of Mind. Cognition 77 (1):25-31.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads41 ( #106,541 of 1,935,138 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #58,844 of 1,935,138 )
How can I increase my downloads?